Abstract. Consider an undirected graph modeling a social network, where the vertices represent users, and the edges do connections among them. In the competitive diffusion game, each of a number of players chooses a vertex as a seed to propagate his/her opinion, and then it spreads along the edges in the graphs. The objective of every player is to maximize the number of vertices the opinion infects. In this paper, we investigate a computational problem of asking whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists in the competitive diffusion game on unweighed and weighted graphs, and present several negative and positive results. We first prove that the problem is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of players even for unweighted graphs. We also show that the problem is NP-hard even for series-parallel graphs with positive integer weights, and is NP-hard even for forests with arbitrary integer weights. Furthermore, we show that the problem for forest of paths with arbitrary weights is solvable in pseudo-polynomial time; and it is solvable in quadratic time if a given graph is unweighted. We also prove that the problem for chain, cochain, and threshold graphs with arbitrary integer weights is solvable in polynomial time.
Introduction
Social networks plays an important role in human interactions in recent years, through which we can propagate ideas, findings, innovations and trends. An action some influential users exhibit spreads over social networks, and greatly affects public opinion formation. The dynamics of such diffusion process is a major research subject on game-theoretic analysis of social networks. In particular, Alon et al. [1] focused on a setting of a diffusion process where a number of players compete to propagate their opinions on a topic over a social network. In this setting, each player chooses a user who acts as a seed of the opinion, and then the opinion spreads along the connections in a social network in discrete time step. The objective of every player is to maximize the number of users their opinions infect. This setting models, for example, a situation where a number of firms compete in a specific market, and want to advertise their products via viral marketing; each firm chooses an influential user to maximize the number of users who buy their product. Alon et al. formalized this process as the competitive diffusion game on unweighted graphs. In this paper, we generalize the game to weighted graphs, and investigate its computational complexity. We below define the game more formally.
In the competitive diffusion game, a social network is modeled by an undirected graph G = (V, E), where the vertex set V represents users, the edge set E does their connections; thus, their neighbors do friends they communicate. After some user exhibits an opinion, it spreads along the edges in the graph. We then define a weight function w : V → Z which represents a level of importance of each user; we admit that a weight on a vertex can be negative to express, for example, a very demanding customer. For a positive integer k, we define [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and call the k players p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k . The competitive diffusion game (k, G, w) proceeds as follows. (See Fig. 1 (a)-(d) for an explicit example.) At time one, each player chooses a vertex in V ; suppose a player p i , i ∈ [k], chooses a vertex v ∈ V . If any other player p j , i = j, does not choose the vertex v, then p i dominates v; and otherwise (that is, if there exists a player p j , i = j, who chooses v), v becomes a neutral vertex which no player can dominate in the following time steps. For each time t, t ≥ 2, a vertex v ∈ V is dominated by a player p i at time t if (i) v is neither neutral nor dominated by any player by time (t − 1), and (ii) v has a neighbor dominated by p i , but does not have a neighbor dominated by any player p j , i = j. If v satisfies (i) and there are two or more players who dominate neighbors of v, then v becomes a neutral vertex at time t. The game ends when no player can dominate a vertex any more. Let s = (s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s (k) ) ∈ V k be the vector of vertices which the players choose at the beginning of the game. We call s a strategy profile. For every i ∈ [k], we define a utility U i (s) of p i for s as the sum of the weights of the vertices which p i dominates at the end. (See Fig. 1 
(d).)
We note that a neutral vertex is a key notion of the competitive diffusion game; it sometimes gives critical effect on the result. (See Fig 2. ) This contrasts to a similar game, called Voronoi game, where a player can dominate all the nearest vertices; if there is a vertex whose distances to strategies of two or more players tie, then they do not dominate but share the vertex [2, 4, 13] .
For an index i ∈ [k], we define (s −i , v ) as a strategy profile such that p i chooses v instead of s (i) , but any other player p j , i = j, chooses s (j) : (s −i , v) = (s (1) , s (2) , . . . , s (i−1) , v , s (i+1) , . . . , s (k) ). For simplicity, we write U i (s −i , v ) for U i ((s −i , v )). Then, if s satisfies
for every i ∈ [k] and every v ∈ V , we say that s is a (pure) Nash equilibrium. The strategy profile given in Fig. 1(b) is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium. Since Alon et al. proposed the competitive diffusion game in [1] , several results are obtained for the game on unweighted graphs. In the same paper, Alon et al. observed that there exists an unweighted graph G of diameter three such that (2, G, w) does not admit a Nash equilibrium [1] . Takehara improved their result and showed that there exists an unweighted graph G of diameter two such that (2, G, w) does not admit a Nash equilibrium [11] . (Besides, they refute a theorem given in [1] .) Small and Mason considered the case where a social network has a tree structure, and show that, for any unweighted tree G, (2, G, w) has a Nash equilibrium [10] .
In this paper, we consider a problem, named Competitive Diffusion, of deciding whether, given the number k, a graph G and weight function w, the competitive diffusion game (k, G, w) has a Nash equilibrium. Recently, Etesami and Baser studied the problem, and showed that Competitive Diffusion is a NP-complete problem [3] . We strengthen their result, and generalize it in terms of weight functions. More formally, we obtain the following three negative results: (i) Competitive Diffusion is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the number of players even for unweighted graphs; (ii) Competitive Diffusion is NPcomplete even for series-parallel graphs with positive integer weights; and (iii) Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for forests with arbitrary integer weights. Our results imply that the computational complexity of Competitive Diffusion may be much influenced by weights on vertices. We note that the results given in [3] does not imply ours.
Furthermore, we obtain several positive results on Competitive Diffusion. For forests of paths, we prove that Competitive Diffusion is solvable in pseudo-polynomial time. In particular, we give a quadratic-time algorithm for forests of unweighted paths. For chain, cochain, and threshold graphs with arbitrary integer weights, we also provide polynomial time algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, no nontrivial algorithm is known even for unweighted version of Competitive Diffusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our hardness results for Competitive Diffusion. In Section 3, we give algorithms for forests of paths. In Section 4, we provide an algorithm for chain, cochain, and threshold graphs.
Complexity of Competitive Diffusion
In this section, we show that Competitive Diffusion is basically hard computational problem. In Section 2.1, we show W[1]-hardness for unweighted graphs. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we show NP-completeness for series-parallel graphs with nonnegative integer weights and NP-completeness for forests with arbitrary integer weights, respectively.
Unweighted Graphs
In this section, we prove that the problem is W [1]-hard for the number of players, as in the following theorem. We prove the theorem by reduction from a well-known W [1]-hard problem, Independent Set [5] . Given a graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer k, Independent Set asks whether there exists an independent set I of size at least k, where a set I(⊆ V ) is called an independent set if there is no pair of vertices u, v ∈ I such that (u, v) ∈ E. Below we show that, given G and k, one can construct a competitive diffusion game (k + 3, G , w ) such that G has an independent set I of size |I| ≥ k if and only if (k + 3, G , w ) has a pure Nash equilibrium, where G and w is a graph and weight obtained from G. Let n = |V | and m = |E|, and let δ v be the degree of v for every v ∈ V . [Construction of G and w ]
The graph G consists of two disjoint component graphs A = (V A , E A ) and B = (V B , E B ).
We obtain the graph A as follows. We construct a path of four vertices a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ; and make 2n vertices a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n and a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n . Then we connect a 1 to a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , and connect a 4 to a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n . See Fig. 3(a) . We obtain the graph B from the original graph G as follows. For every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, we add a vertex b e subdividing e. Then, for each v ∈ V , we make a set D v of n−δ v vertices, and connect v to every u ∈ D v . Lastly we make a vertex b and λ vertices b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b λ , where λ is a sufficiently large number satisfying λ = Θ(n 3 ), and connect b to every v ∈ V , and connect b to b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b λ .
Thus, G = (V , E ) is such a graph that V = V A ∪ V B and E = E A ∪ E B . We define the weight of every vertex as one: w : V → {1}.
We now show that G has an independent set I of size |I| ≥ k if and only if (k + 3, G , w ) has a pure Nash equilibrium. We first verify the sufficiency. Lemma 1. If there exists an independent set I ⊆ V satisfying k ≤ |I|, then (k + 3, G , w ) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let I ⊆ I be an arbitrary fixed subset of I such that |I | = k, and let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k be the vertices in I . Then the following strategy profile s * is shown to be a Nash equilibrium. The strategy profile s * : For each i ∈ [k], p i chooses v i . The player p k+1 chooses b. The players p k+2 and p k+3 choose a 2 and a 3 , respectively.
Let us estimate the utility of each player. Firstly, consider p i for every i ∈ [k]. The player p i chooses v i , and v i is connected to n − δ v vertices in D v and δ v subdivisions. Since I is an independent set, p i dominates all these vertices. However, at time two, p k+1 dominates every vertex in V \I . Thus, for every
Secondly, consider the player p k+1 . Since p k+1 dominates at least b and
Lastly, we have
Below we show that s * is a Nash equilibrium by verifying Eq. (1). We omit the cases where a player changes the strategy to a vertex chosen by another player.
. If p i chooses a vertex in V A , then, clearly p i dominates at most n + 1 vertices. If p i chooses b e for some e ∈ E or u ∈ D v for some v, then p i dominates exactly one vertex due to p k+1 . Suppose p i chooses v ∈ V . If there exists e = (u, v ) such that u ∈ I , p i does not dominate a vertex b e , and hence p i dominates less than n + 1 vertices. Otherwise, p i dominates exactly n + 1 vertices, as in Eq. (2) . Thus, the utility of p i does not increase from Eq. (2).
(ii) p k+1
If p k+1 chooses any vertex in V A , p k+1 dominates at most n + 1 vertices. If p k+1 chooses any vertex in V B \{b}, p k+1 cannot dominate b, and hence dominates at most
Since λ = Θ(n 3 ), the utility of p k+1 does not increase from Eq. (3).
(iii) p k+2 , p k+3 Both of p k+2 and p k+3 dominate at most n + 1 vertices, as same in (i). Thus, the utilities of p k+2 and p k+3 do not increase from Eq. (4).
We can also verify the necessity which complete the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 2. If (k + 3, G , w ) has a Nash equilibrium, then we can construct an independent set I of G such that |I| = k.
Proof. Let s
* be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (k + 3, G , w ). We say that a strategy profile s is standard if s satisfies the following conditions:
We then have the following proposition whose proof will be given in the appendix. Proposition 1. If (k+3, G , w ) has a Nash equilibrium s * , then s * is standard.
Proposition 1 implies that s * is standard. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that the player p i chooses v i ∈ V for every i ∈ [k], p k+1 does b, p k+2 does a 2 , and p k+3 does a 3 . Then, we can show that I = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k } is an independent set, as follows.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an edge e = (
Since b e becomes neutral at time two, neither p i nor p i dominate b e . Moreover, p k+1 dominates every vertex v ∈ V \I . Thus, we have
On the other hand, if the players p i and p i change their strategy to a 1 (or a 2 ), they dominate n + 1 vertices: U i (s * −i , a 1 ) = n + 1 and U i (s * −i , a 1 ) = n + 1, which contradict that s * is a Nash equilibrium.
Nonnegative Integer Weights
In this section, we consider graphs with nonnegative integer weights, and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for series-parallel graphs with nonnegative integer weights.
It is easy to observe that Competitive Diffusion is contained in NP: Given the number k of players, graph G, weight w and a strategy profile s, we can compute U i (s) for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, in polynomial time just by simulating the game (k, G, w). Thus, we can verify in polynomial time whether s * is a Nash equilibrium by checking Eq. (1) for every pair of i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and u ∈ V .
We below prove that Competitive Diffusion is NP-hard by a reduction from Partition which asks, given a multiset S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 2n } of 2n positive integers, whether there exists a subset S ⊆ [2n] such that
where α = ( 2n j=1 s j )/2. Partition is well-known to be NP-complete [6] .
We below construct a series-parallel graph G S and a weight function w S for G S such that there exists S ⊆ [2n] satisfying Eq. (5) if and only if (2n + 4, G S , w S ) has a Nash equilibrium.
[Construction of G S and w S ]
The graph G S consists of two disjoint component graphs A = (V A , E A ) and
The graph A is a path of four vertices a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , where for every i, Fig. 4(a) .
We construct B, as follows. For every j ∈ [2n], we make a cycle of five vertices Fig. 4(b) .
We now verify the following two lemmas. 
The player p 2n+1 dominates b together with b j ,1 and b j ,2 for every j ∈ S . Thus,
Similarly, p 2n+2 dominates b together with b j ,1 and b j ,5 for every j ∈ S . Thus,
Each of p 2n+3 and p 2n+4 dominate the two vertices in A, and hence
We now verify that s is a Nash equilibrium. We omit the cases where a player changes the strategy to a vertex already chosen by another player.
Consider an arbitrary player
We can similarly verify the case for p 2n+3 and p 2n+4 . (ii) p 2n+1 and p 2n+2
Let i ∈ {2n + 1, 2n + 2}. Smilarly to (i), We then have the following proposition whose proof will be given in the appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that s * is standard. Let S (resp., S ) be the set of indices i ∈ [2n] which a player chooses b i,4 (resp., b i,3 ). Let p 2n+1 and p 2n+2 be the players choosing b and b , respectively. Clearly,
while
Since s * is a Nash equilibrium, Eqs. (10) and (11) imply that 2α ≤ α+ j ∈S s j , and hence
Similarly, we have U 2n+2 (s * ) = α + j ∈S s j , and hence
Since j ∈S s j + j ∈S s j = 2α, Eqs. (12) and (13) imply that S and S are the desired partition.
Arbitrary Integer Weights
In this section, we prove that the problem is NP-hard even for forests.
Theorem 3.
Competitive Diffusion is NP-complete even for forests of two components.
To prove the theorem, we employ Partition, as in the proof of Theorem 2; but we here assume that the subset S satisfies |S | = n; Partition remains NP-complete under this additional condition [6] . Moreover, We assume without loss of generality that s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 2n are even; if it is not the case, we simply double each of s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 2n .
Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 2n } be an input of Partition, and α = ( [Construction of G S and w S ]
The graph A is a path of four vertices a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , where for every i,
We then construct B, as follows. For every j ∈ [2n], we make a graph B j consisting of a vertex b j together with b j,1 , b j,2 and b j,3 which compose a complete bipartite graph K 1,3 . We complete B by making a path of five vertices 
Similarly to the previous sections, we can prove that there exists S ⊆ [2n] satisfying Eq. (5) if and only if (2n + 4, G S , w S ) has a Nash equilibrium. The proof is omitted, but given in the the appendix.
Algorithms for Forests of Paths
In the last section, we have shown that Competitive Diffusion is a computationally hard problem. However, we can solve the problem for some particular graph classes. In Section 3.1, we give a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to solve Competitive Diffusion for forests of weighted paths; as its consequence, we show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time for forest of unweighted paths. In Section 3.2, we improve the running time of our algorithm to a quadratic time for the unweighted case.
Forests of weighted paths
Let F be a forest consisting of weighted m paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m , and let W j be the sum of the positive weights in a path P j , j ∈ [m]. Then, we define W = max j∈[m] W j as the upper bound on utility for F , that is, any player can obtain at most W in F . In this subsection, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let F be a forest of weighted paths. Let n and W be the number of vertices in F and the upper bound on utility for F , respectively. Then, we can solve Competitive Diffusion, and find a Nash equilibrium, if any, in O(W n 9 ) time.
We note that W = O(n) if F is an unweighted graph. Therefore, by Theorem 4, Competitive Diffusion is solvable in O(n 10 ) time for an unweighted graph F ; this running time will be improved to O(n 2 ) in Section 3.2.
Idea and definitions.
Let F be a given forest consisting of weighted m paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m . Let w be a given weight function; we sometimes denote by w j the weight function restricted to the path P j , j ∈ [m]. Suppose that, for an integer k, there exists a strategy profile s for the game (k, F, w) that is a Nash equilibrium. Then, the strategy profile restricted to each path P j , j ∈ [m], forms a Nash equilibrium for (k j , P j , w j ), where k j is the number of players who chose vertices in P j . However, the other direction does not always hold: A Nash equilibrium s j for (k j , P j , w j ) is not always extended to a Nash equilibrium for the whole forest F , because some player may increase its utility by moving to another path in F . To capture such a situation, we classify a Nash equilibrium for a (single) path P j more precisely.
Consider the game (κ j , P j , w j ) for an integer κ j ≥ 0. For a strategy profile s j for (κ j , P j , w j ), we define µ Pj (s j ) as the minimum utility over all the κ j players:
. In other words, any player in P j obtains the utility at least µ Pj (s j ). For the case where κ j = 0, we define s j = ∅ as the unique strategy profile for (κ j , P j , w j ); then, s j is a Nash equilibrium and we define µ Pj (s j ) = +∞.
For a strategy profile s j = s
for (κ j , P j , w j ), we then define the "potential" of the maximum utility under s j that can be expected to gain by an extra player other than the κ j players. More formally, for a vertex v in P j , we denote by s j + v the strategy profile s
For two nonnegative integers κ j and t, we say that P j admits κ j players with a boundary t if there exists a strategy profile s j such that s j is a Nash equilibrium for (κ j , P j , w j ) and ν Pj (s j ) ≤ t ≤ µ Pj (s j ) holds. Then, the following lemma characterizes a Nash equilibrium of the game (k, F, w) in terms of the components of F ; the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 5. The game (k, F, w) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist nonnegative integers κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m and t such that k = m j=1 κ j and P j admits κ j players with the common boundary t for every j ∈ [m].
Algorithm.
We first focus on a weighted single path.
Lemma 6. Let P be a weighted path of n vertices, and t be a nonnegative integer. Then, one can find in O(n 9 ) time the set K ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 2n} of all the integers κ such that P admits κ players with boundary t.
Based on Lemma 6, we can obtain the m sets
, is the set of all the integers κ such that P admits κ players with boundary t. This can be done in O(n 9 ) time, where n is the number of vertices in the whole forest F .
We now claim that, for a given integer t, it can be decided in O(n 3 ) time whether there exist nonnegative integers κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m such that k = m j=1 κ j and P j admits κ j players with the common boundary t for every j ∈ [m]; later we will apply this procedure to all possible values of t, 0 ≤ t ≤ W . To show this, observe that finding desired m integers κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m from the m sets K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K m can be regarded as solving an instance of the multiple-choice knapsack problem [8] : The capacity c of the knapsack is equal to k; Each integer κ in K j , j ∈ [m], corresponds to an item with profit κ and cost κ ; The items from the same set K j form one class, from which at most one item can be packed into the knapsack. The multiple-choice knapsack problem can be solved in O(cN ) time [8] , where N is the number of all items. Since c = k and N = O(mn), we can solve the corresponding instance in time O(kmn) = O(n 3 ). We finally apply the procedure above to all possible values of boundaries t. Since any player can obtain at most the upper bound W on utility for F , it suffices to consider t ∈ [W ]. Therefore, our algorithm runs in O(W n 9 ) time in total.
Forests of unweighted paths
In this subsection, we improve the running time of our algorithm in Section 3.1 to a quadratic time when restricted to the unweighted case.
Theorem 5. Let F be a forest of unweighted paths, and n be the number of vertices in F . Then, we can solve Competitive Diffusion, and find a Nash equilibrium, if any, in O(n 2 ) time.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider unweighted graphs, and thus define w : V → {1} for the vertex set V of a given forest. We assume that the number k of players is less than n; otherwise, a Nash equilibrium always exists. Note that, in this case, every player has utility at least one for any Nash equilibrium.
We first show that the set K j of Lemma 6 can be obtained in O(1) time, instead of O(n 9 ) time, by characterizing Nash equilibriums for (κ, P, w) in terms of κ, t and n.
Lemma 7. Let P be a single unweighted path of n vertices, and let κ and t be nonnegative and positive integers, respectively.
(
By Lemme 7, we can immediately obtain the number of players which P admits with a given boundary t: Corollary 1. Consider a fixed boundary t. If P is a path of n vertices, the numbers of players which P admits with a boundary t is given as follows.
(1) If n ≤ t − 1, the number is only 0.
(2) If n = t, the numbers are 0 and 1. (3) If t + 1 ≤ n ≤ 2t − 1, the number is only 1. (4) If 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 1 and n = 3, the numbers are 1, 2 and 3; and if 2t ≤ n ≤ 2t + 1 and n = 3, the numbers are 1 and 2. (5) If n = 2t + 2 and n = 4, the numbers are 2, 3 and 4; and if n = 2t + 2 and n = 4, the number is only 2. (6) If 2t + 3 ≤ n ≤ 4t − 1, P has no desired Nash equilibrium. (7) If 4t ≤ n and 5 ≤ n, the numbers are integers κ such that
where k odd is the maximum odd integer satisfying k odd ≤ (n − t + 1)/t, and k even is the maximum even integer satisfying k even ≤ n/t.
We use Corollary 1 to design our algorithm for forests of paths. Without loss of generality, we assume that P 1 is a longest path among the m paths, and has n 1 vertices. For each t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n 1 , we repeat the following procedure: For every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we obtain, using Corollary 1, the minimum number k min j and the maximum number k max j of players which P j admits with the boundary t. Corollary 1 implies that, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, P j admits κ players with t for any κ between k min j and k max j , and hence (k, F, w) has a Nash equilibrium with the common boundary t if and only if
We thus complete the procedure by checking if the two inequalities in (15) both hold. Since Corollary 1 implies that we can obtain k min j and k max j in constant time for every j, the running time of the procedure above for single t is O(m), and hence that of our entire algorithm is O(n 1 m) = O(n 2 ), as desired.
Algorithms for Chain, Cochain, and Threshold Graphs
A bipartite graph B = (X, Y ; E) with |X| = p and |Y | = q is a chain graph if there is an ordering (
, where N (u) denote a set of neighbors of a vertex u. If there is such an ordering on X, then there also exists an ordering (y 1 , y 2 , . . . ,
. We call such orderings inclusion orderings.
A graph B is a cochain graph if it can be obtained from a chain graph B = (X, Y ; E) by making the independents sets X and Y into cliques. A graph B is a threshold graph if it can be obtained from a chain graph B = (X, Y ; E) by making one of the independents sets X and Y into a clique. Observe that inclusion orderings on X and Y in B can be seen as inclusion orderings in B and B if we use closed neighborhoods in cliques. Such inclusion orderings can be found in linear time [7] . Because the algorithm for chain graphs we will describe in this section depends only on its property of having inclusion orderings, we can apply the exactly same algorithm for cochain graphs and threshold graphs.
The following lemma follows directly from the definitions. Note that
In what follows, let B = (X, Y ; E) be a chain graph with inclusion orderings (x 1 , . . . , x p ) and (y 1 , . . . , y q ) on X and Y , respectively. We define η(s, X) = max({0} ∪ {i | x i ∈ V (s)}) and η(s, Y ) = max({0} ∪ {i | y i ∈ V (s)}).
Lemma 9. Let s be a Nash equilibrium of B. If
) by Lemma 8. Suppose for the contrary that there exists N (y η(s,Y ) ). Thus, by Lemma 8, we have U i (s −i , u) = w(u) > w(s (i) ) ≥ U i (s). This contradicts the assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, it suffices to check the strategy profiles satisfying Eq. (16) for our purpose. R := {x i | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {y i | i < η(s, Y )}.
6:
while there is a player i not assigned to a vertex do 7: v := arg max u∈R w(u). 
12:
end if
13:
end while
14:
return s if it is a Nash equilibrium. 15: end for 16: return "no Nash equilibrium" Theorem 6. Let G be a chain, cochain, or threshold graph of n vertices and m edges. Then, we can solve Competitive Diffusion for G, and find a Nash equilibrium, if any, in O(n 4 (m + n)) time.
Proof. We present an algorithm for chain graphs only. As previously described, we can apply the same algorithm for cochain and threshold graph. We first guess η(s, X) and η(s, Y ). Here we assume η(s, X) = 0. The other case can be treated in the same way by swapping X and Y . We assign x η(s,X) to the first player. If η(s, Y ) = 0, then we assign y η(s,Y ) to the second player. By Lemma 9, if s is a Nash equilibrium, then the other players have to select the heaviest vertices in {x i | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {y i | i < η(s, Y )}. For each of the remaining players, we assign a vacant vertex with the maximum non-negative weight. If there is no such a vertex, we assign x η(s,X) . We then test whether the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. See Algorithm 1.
Lemma 9 implies that if the algorithm assigns at most one player to x η(s,X) , then the algorithm is correct. If two or more players are assigned to x η(s,X) , then these players have utility 0. In such a case, there are not enough number of vertices of non-negative weights in {x i | i < η(s, X)} ∪ {y i | i < η(s, Y )}. Thus every s with the guesses η(s, X) and η(s, Y ) has a player with non-positive utility. If such a player, say p i , has negative utility, then s is clearly not a Nash equilibrium. If p i has utility 0, then it may improve its utility only if there is a vertex v ∈ {x η(s,X)+1 , . . . , x p } ∪ {y η(s,Y )+1 , . . . , y q } such that U i (s −i , v) > 0. However, in this case, there is no Nash equilibrium with the guesses η(s, X) and η(s, Y ). Therefore, the algorithm is correct.
We now analyze the running time of the algorithm. We have O(n 2 ) options for guessing x η(s,X) and y η(s,Y ) . For each guess, the bottle-neck of the running time is to test whether the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium or not. It takes O(n 2 (m + n)) time as follows: we have O(n 2 ) candidates of moves of players; for each candidate, we can compute the utility of the player moved by running a breadth-first search once in O(m + n) time by adding a virtual root connecting to all the vertices occupied by the players. In total, the algorithm runs in O(n 4 (m + n)) time.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Our proof of Proposition 1 consists of a sequence of claims, and we prove each claim by contradiction: we suppose that a claim does not hold, and show that it contradicts the fact that s * is a Nash equilibrium. Let s * be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (k + 3, G , w ). We start by the following claim. Claim 1. There are at most two players choosing vertices in V A .
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there are k (≥ 3) players choosing vertices in V A . Then there exists a players p i dominating at most one vertex:
On the other hand, every v ∈ V has n − δ v (≥ 1) neighbors for every v ∈ V , and b has λ + n(≥ 1) neighbors, and thus there are n + 1 vertices (i.e., ones in V and b) by which p i can dominate at least two vertices by changing the strategy. Since we have k ≥ 3, there are at most k(≤ n) players choosing vertices in V B , and hence we have a contradiction.
Then, we prove the following claim. 
On the other hand, p i can dominate, by changing the strategy to b, at least b together with some of b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b λ and the vertices in V . In this case, since each of the other k + 2 ≤ n + 2 players can dominate at most two vertices of b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b λ and the vertices in V due to p i , we have
We complete the proof of Lemma 1 by verifying the following two claims. Proof. By Claim 1, it suffices to consider the case where there are at most two players choosing vertices in V A . Consider the case where exactly two players choose vertices in V A other than "a 2 and a 3 ." Without loss of generality, the chosen vertices are "a 1 and a 2 ," "a 1 and a 3 ," "a 1 and a 4 ," or one of the players chooses a 1 . For any of them, one player can increase the utility by choosing a 2 or a 3 .
Consider the other case where at most one player chooses a vertex in V A . Then, there are at least k + 2 players choosing vertices in V B . Since Claim 2 implies that some player chooses b, each of the other players dominates at most n + 1 vertices; let p i be one of them: U i (s * ) ≤ n + 1. On the other hand, we have either
Claim 4. s * satisfies A.1.
Proof. Suppose there exists a player p i choosing either u ∈ D v for some v ∈ V , b e for some e ∈ E, or one of b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b λ . Claim 2 implies that p i dominates only one vertex: U i (s * ) ≤ 1. However, Claim 3 implies that
B Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we prove Proposition 2. As in the last section, our proof consists of a sequence of claims.
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s * of (2n+4, G S , w S ). We first verify the following claim:
Proof. Suppose s * does not satisfy (B.3). We consider the following three cases (i), (ii) and (iii). (i) More than three players choose vertices in A.
Suppose there are at least three players choosing vertices in V A , which implies that there exists a player p whose utility is at most one. Moreover, at most 2n+1 players choose vertices in V B , and there are 4n + 2 vertices with weight α. Thus, the player p obtain the utility α(> 1) by changing the strategy to a vertex in V B , which contradicts the fact that s * is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Exactly two players choose vertices in A.
Since s * does not satisfy (B.3), we can assume without loss of generality that the two players choose either "a 1 and a 2 ," "a 1 and a 3 " or " a 1 and a 4 ." For both cases, a player can increase the utility by choosing a 2 or a 3 . (iii) At most one player chooses a vertex in A.
In this case, there exists a vertex in V A such that any player obtain utility 2α + 1 by changing the strategy to it. Thus, it suffices to show that one of the other 2n + 3 (or 2n + 4) players has utility at most 2α. Clearly, the players, in this case, choose vertices in V B , while the sum of the weights of all the vertices in V B is (2α + s j ) + α + α = 4nα + 4α = 2α(2n + 2).
Thus, at least one player has utility less than 2α, as desired.
We now consider the other 2n + 2 players choosing vertices in V B . For every j, j ∈ [2n], we define P j as a set of indices of the players who choose b j,1 , b j,2 , b j,3 , b j,4 or b j,5 on s * . We then have the following claim.
Proof. Note that, by Claim 5, any player can obtain the utility 2α by changing the strategy to a 1 . Furthermore, the sum of all the weights of the vertices in V B is exactly 2α(2n + 2). Thus, to derive a contradiction, it suffices to show that some vertex with a positive weight becomes neutral or there exists a player whose utility is less than (or more than) 2α.
If there exists j such that |P j | ≥ 4, then we can verify by exhaustive search that there must exist a player p i , i ∈ P j , has the utility less than 2α.
If there exists j such that |P j | = 3, we can assume that the three players choose either b j,1 , b j,2 and b j,3 or b j,1 , b j,4 and b j,5 ; otherwise, a player p i , i ∈ P j , must have the utility less than 2α or one of b j,1 , b j,3 and b j,4 becomes neutral. Without loss of generality, we consider the former case. Then, the player choosing b j,1 dominates b j,1 and b j,5 , and also may dominate b ; but, cannot do any of the other vertices with positive weights due to the player dominating b or the one choosing b j,2 . Thus, the player choosing b j,1 has the utility at most s j + α < 2α.
Suppose there exists j such that |P j | = 2; let p and p be the two players. We consider the following two cases. We thus complete the proof of the claim. Proof. Claims 5 and 6 immediately imply that exactly two players must choose b and b , and hence s * satisfies (B.2). Therefore, we have |P j | = 1 for every j ∈ [2n]; otherwise, a vertex with weight s j such that |P j | = 0 becomes neutral. Consequently, s * satisfies (B.1): otherwise a vertex with a positive weight becomes neutral, or the game end while such vertex is not dominated by any player
C Proof of Theorem 3
In
C.1 Main Proof
We first prove the sufficiency of the theorem. Proof. Let S ⊆ [2n] be a subset satisfying Eq. (5). We denote by j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j n ∈ [2n] the indices of the integers in S , that is, S = {s j1 , s j2 , . . . , s jn }. Then, the following strategy profile s * is shown to be a Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile s * : For each i ∈ [n], the players p 2i−1 and p 2i choose b ji,1 and b ji,2 , respectively. The player p 2n+1 chooses b 1 , p 2n+2 does b 5 , p 2n+3 does a 2 , and p 2n+4 does a 3 , respectively.
We estimate the utility of each player. Consider the players p 2i−1 and p 2i for every i ∈ [n] . Since b i becomes neutral, p 2i−1 dominates only b i,1 , and p 2i does only b i,2 . Thus, for every i ∈ [n],
The player p 2n+1 dominates only b 1 and b 2 . Thus,
The player p 2n+2 dominates b 4 and b 5 ; besides, p 2n+2 rules B j for every j ∈ [2n]\S . Thus, Eq. (5) implies that
The players p 2n+3 and p 2n+4 dominate two vertices in A, and hence
Below we show that s * is a Nash equilibrium by verifying Eq. (1). We omit the cases where a player changes the strategy to a vertex chosen by another player. (i) p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p 2n , p 2n+3 , p 2n+4 Consider an arbitrary player p i , i ∈ [2n] ∪ {2n + 3, 2n + 4}. By Eq. (17) and (20), it suffices to show that
and hence Eq. (5) implies that
By Eq. (18), it suffices to show that
, and also rules B j for every j ∈ [2n]\S . Thus, by Eq. (5),
By Eq. (19), it suffices to show that We then have the following lemma whose proof will be given in the next section.
Proposition 3. If (2n + 4, G S , w S ) has a Nash equilibrium s * , then s * is standard.
Let s * be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of (2n + 4, G S , w S ); Proposition 3 implies that s * is standard. Let S = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j n } ⊆ [2n]. We can assume without loss of generality that, for each i ∈ [n], the players p 2i−1 and p 2i choose b ji,1 and b ji,2 , respectively; p 2n+1 chooses b 1 , p 2n+2 does b 5 , p 2n+3 does a 2 , and p 2n+4 does a 3 .
Since p 2n+1 dominates only b 1 and b 2 ,
Besides, if p 2n+1 changes the strategy to b 4 , p 2n+1 dominates b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 , and rules B j for every j ∈ [2n]\S :
Since s * is a Nash equilibrium, Eqs. (21) and (22) imply that
On the other hand, p 2n+2 dominates b 4 , b 5 , and rules B j for every j ∈ [2n]\S :
Besides, if p 2n+2 changes the strategy to a 1 , p 2n+2 dominates only a 1 :
Therefore, Eqs. (24) and (25) imply that
By Eqs. (23) and (26),
Since s j is even for every j ∈ [2n], we have
and hence S is the desired partition.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s * of (2n+4, G S , w S ). For every j ∈ [2n], we define β j as the number of players who choose vertices in B j on s * . Firstly, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8. s
* satisfies (C.3).
Proof. Suppose s * does not satisfy (C.3). We derive a contradiction for each of (i), (ii) and (iii) below. (i) More than three players choose vertices in A.
In this case, there exists a player p i such that U i (s * ) ≤ 1, and at most 2n + 1 players choose vertices in V B .
If there exists j ∈ [2n] such that β j = 0, p i can rule B j by changing the strategy to b j . Moreover, if p i also dominates b 4 , p i does b 5 ; and if p i also dominates b j for some j ∈ [2n], p i rules B j . Therefore, since s j is even,
Otherwise, that is, if β j ≥ 1 for every j ∈ [2n], then there exists j ∈ [2n] such that β j = 1. Thus, p i can dominate only either b j ,1 or b j ,2 , and hence, for some
(ii) exactly two players choose vertices in A.
Since s * does not satisfy (C.3), we can assume without loss of generality that the two players choose either "a 1 and a 2 ," "a 1 and a 3 " or " a 1 and a 4 ." For both cases, a player can increase the utility by choosing a 2 or a 3 .
(iii) at most one player chooses a vertex in A.
In this case, there exists a vertex in V A such that any player obtains utility α + 1 by changing the strategy to the vertex. Thus, it suffices to show that some player has utility at most α. Note that at least 2n + 3 players choose vertices in V B in this case.
If there exists j ∈ [2n] such that β j ≥ 2, then one of the players has utility at most α, as desired. If there exists a pair of j, j ∈ [2n] such that β j = β j = 1, one of the players (say, the one who choose a vertex in B j ) cannot dominate b 4 , and hence its utility is less than or equals to α, as desired. Otherwise, that is, if either β j = 0 for every j ∈ [2n] or there exists an unique j ∈ [2n] such that β j = 1, then the other players choose b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 , b 5 , and hence some player has utility at most zero.
We below consider the other 2n + 2 players who choose vertices in V B .
Claim 9. For every j ∈ [2n], β j ≤ 2; and there exists at most one j ∈ [2n] such that β j = 1.
Proof. We first prove that β j ≤ 2 for every j ∈ [2n]. Note that, by Claim 8, any player can obtain the utility α by changing the strategy to a 1 .
Suppose there exists j, j ∈ [2n], such that β j ≥ 4. Then, the utility of one of the players is at most 0 < α, as desired.
Suppose there exists j ∈ 
(ii) No player chooses b 4 . In this case, one of p i and p i does not dominate b 4 ; let p i be such a player. Then, p i rules B j , but does not dominate other verticies. Thus, U i (s * ) = s j < α. 
In the latter case, we have
We thus complete the proof.
By Claims 8 and 10, it suffices to consider the other two player choosing vertices in V B . We complete the proof of Lemma 3 with the following claim. 
D Proof of Lemma 5
Since the necessity is obvious, we only verify the sufficiency. That is, we show that if (k, G, w) has a Nash equilibrium, then there exist κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m and t such that k = m j=1 κ j and P j admits κ j players with a common boundary t for every j ∈ [m]. Note that, if a strategy profile s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ) is a Nash equilibrium, then it trivially holds that ν Pj (s j ) ≤ µ Pj (s j ) for any j ∈ [m].
Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium s, and let s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m be strategy profiles for P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m , and κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m be the numbers of players choosing vertices in P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m , respectively. Suppose for sake of contradiction that no common boundary t exists for P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m with κ 1 , κ 2 , . . . , κ m . Let t be an arbitrary integer such that there exists j satisfying ν Pj (s j ) ≤ t ≤ µ Pj (s j ). Then there is at least an index j such that either µ P j (s j ) < t or t < ν P j (s j ). Let J <t be the set of indices satisfying the former inequality µ P j (s j ) < t, and J t< be the set of indices satisfying the latter inequality µ P j (s j ) < t.
Consider the case for J <t = ∅ and J t< = ∅. In this case, there exists a pair of indices j 1 ∈ J <t and j 2 ∈ J t< such that µ P j 1 (s j 1 ) < ν P j 2 (s j 2 ). Thus, a player in P j 1 can increase the utility by changing the strategy to a vertex in P j 2 .
Consider the other case
, there exists an index j ∈ [m] such that µ P j (s j ) < ν Pj (s j ); otherwise we can choose
as the common boundary. Thus, a player in P j can increase the utility by changing the strategy to a vertex in P j . Similarly, if J t< = [m], there exists an index j ∈ [m] such that µ Pj (s j ) < ν P j (s j ); otherwise we can choose
as the common boundary. Thus, a player in P j can increase the utility by changing the strategy to a vertex in P j .
E Proof of Lemma 6
We give such an algorithm as a proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that we are given a path P of n vertices, together with its weight function w and a nonnegative integer t.
We first note that it is easy to determine whether P admits zero player with the boundary t. In this case, there is only one strategy profile s = ∅ for (0, P, w), and µ P (s) = +∞ ≥ t. Thus, 0 ∈ K if and only if ν P (s) = v∈V (P ) w(v) ≤ t. Clearly, this can be done in O(n) time. In the following, we thus assume that at least one player exists in the game (κ, P, w).
Idea and definitions.
We label the vertices v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n in the path P from left to right. Our algorithm employs a dynamic programming approach based on the number κ of players in P , and mainly keeps truck of the first and second rightmost vertices that are chosen by some of the κ players in P together with the numbers of players who chose them. However, it should be noted that, because we will add a new (κ + 1)-th player to the right side of the currently rightmost player, the utility of the rightmost player may change according to the addition. Therefore, as a "partial" solution, we introduce the notion of "Nash sub-equilibrium" for a weighted path, as follows.
Let s be a strategy profile for the game (κ, P, w) such that κ ≥ 1. We denote by r s the index 1 ≤ r s ≤ n such that v rs is the rightmost vertex chosen by at least one player in s. Let Q s be the set of all players in s who did not choose v rs ; we denote by µ(s; Q s ) the minimum utility over all players in Q s . For two integers x and y, 0 ≤ y < x ≤ n, let ν(s; y, x) = max y≤j≤x U κ+1 (s+v j ). In other words, ν(s; y, x) denotes the potential of the maximum utility under s that can be expected to gain by an extra player other than the κ players when the extra player chooses a vertex from v y , v y+1 , . . . , v x . Then, a strategy profile s for the game (κ, P, w) is called a Nash sub-equilibrium with a boundary t if and only if
(1) ν(s; 1, r s ) ≤ t; (2) µ(s; Q s ) ≥ t; and (3) U j (s −j , v ) ≤ U j (s) for each player j ∈ Q s and v ∈ {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v rs }.
We classify the Nash sub-equilibriums with respect to the first and second rightmost vertices chosen by players. For notational convenience, we introduce a dummy vertex v 0 . Let κ be an integer such that 1 ≤ κ ≤ 2n. Then, we say that (x, a), (y, b) is a feasible set on κ if
We now define our DP table. For a feasible set (x, a), (y, b) on an integer κ ∈ [2n], let f t κ, (x, a), (y, b) =    true if P admits a Nash κ, (x, a), (y, b) -subequilibrium with the boundary t; false otherwise.
Algorithm.
As the initialization, we first compute f t κ, (x, κ), (0, 0) for each integer κ ∈ [2n] and x ∈ [n]. Let s be the strategy profile for (κ, P, w) such that all the κ players choose v x . Then, by the brute-force manner, we can check in O(n 2 ) time whether s is a Nash κ, (x, κ), (0, 0) -sub-equilibrium with the boundary t or not. Therefore, f t κ, (x, κ), (0, 0) can be computed in O(n 4 ) time for all integers κ ∈ [2n] and x ∈ [n].
We then compute f t κ, (x, a), (y, b) for each integer κ ∈ [2n] and its feasible sets (x, a), (y, b) such that b ≥ 1. Suppose that P admits a Nash κ, (x, a), (y, b) -sub-equilibrium s with the boundary t. Then, by removing the a players who chose v x , we can obtain another Nash κ − a, (y, b), (z, c) -subequilibrium s with the boundary t for some feasible set (y, b), (z, c) on κ − a; recall that the utility is not taken into account for the b players who chose v y in s . Therefore, f t κ, (x, a), (y, b) = true if and only if there exists at least one feasible set (y, b), (z, c) on κ − a such that For each feasible set (x, a), (y, b) on κ, we check all feasible sets (y, b), (z, c) on κ−a. The conditions (1)-(4) above can be checked in O(n 2 ) time for one feasible set (y, b), (z, c) . Then, we can compute f t κ, (x, a), (y, b) in time O(n 9 ) for all feasible sets (x, a), (y, b) on κ.
Finally, we compute the desired set K, as follows: An integer κ is in K if and only if there exists a feasible set (x, a), (y, b) on κ such that f t κ, (x, a), (y, b) = true and Conditions (1)-(3) of Lemma 12 are satisfied. This can be done in time O(n 7 ). In this way, our algorithm runs in time O(n 9 ) in total. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
F Proof of Lemma 7
Let P be a path of n vertices. We denote by κ and t by the number of players choosing vertices in P and a boundary t, respectively.
